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Abstract. Deep learning, computational neuroscience, and cognitive
science have overlapping goals related to understanding intelligence such
that perception and behaviour can be simulated in computational sys-
tems. In neuroimaging, machine learning methods have been used to test
computational models of sensory information processing. Recently, these
model comparison techniques have been used to evaluate deep neural
networks (DNNs) as models of sensory information processing. However,
the interpretation of such model evaluations is muddied by imprecise
statistical conclusions. Here, we make explicit the types of conclusions
that can be drawn from these existing model comparison techniques and
how these conclusions change when the model in question is a DNN. We
discuss how DNNs are amenable to new model comparison techniques
that allow for stronger conclusions to be made about the computational
mechanisms underlying sensory information processing.
Keywords: deep learning, model comparison, cognitive neuroscience,
neuroimaging, MVPA, encoding, representational similarity analysis
1 The goal of information-based neuroimage analysis
In the last 15 years, information-based approaches have become a popular tech-
nique for analyzing neuroimaging data. Typically this involves evaluating a
model of human perception or cognition on its ability to predict some measure
of brain activity. In studies of sensory information processing, the model usually
consists of some signal processing applied to the stimuli. Recently, researchers
have begun using deep neural networks (DNN)s, trained on large datasets, as
models to be evaluated in this information based-approach. How might this ap-
proach lead to a better understanding of sensory information processing? What
types of conclusions can be drawn from information-based approaches and are
those conclusions dependent on the type of model being evaluated? To answer
these questions, we must first consider the nature of the understanding that we
wish to extract from these analyses.
2Several authors have recently discussed “what constitutes an explanation?” A
common theme is to invoke Marr’s levels of analysis [30, 21, 37, 13, 4, 31, 35]. The
first level, computational theory, is concerned with the ‘what’ and ‘why’. What
is the system doing and why is it doing it? The next level is representation and
algorithm, which is concerned with ‘how’ the computational theory is carried
out. What are the input and output representations and what is the algorithm
that transforms one into the other? The last level is the hardware implementa-
tion, which is concerned with the physical realization of the representation and
algorithm. Marr argues that these different layers can be studied separately but
ultimately should be consistent with one another for a system to be understood
[24]. Poeppel argues that there is currently a granularity mismatch between the
units of neurobiology and the units of cognition and perception. He suggests
that we should focus on the representation and algorithm level to help bridge
this mismatch [2012]. Love [21] has also suggested that the inside-out approach,
starting with the representation and algorithm level and working upward to the
computational level and downward to the implementation level, is best way to
achieve compatible understanding at all three layers. Evaluating computational
models on their correspondence to neuroimaging data can be viewed as a way
to bridge the representational and implementation levels of understanding [21].
Marr & Nishihara [23] define a representation as “a formal system for making
explicit certain entities or types of information, together with a specification of
how the system does this.” For example, the Arabic numeral 37 is a description of
the number 37 that makes explicit its decomposition into powers of ten. A binary
representation of the same number would make explicit its decomposition into
powers of two. A representation will often be a useful abstraction. For example,
we can represent strands of DNA as sequences of nucleotides, represented by the
letters A, T, C and G. Similarly, the brain is likely to use various representations
of sensory information at different stages to facilitate computation.
2 What can be learned from information-based analyses?
In studying sensory information processing, we are concerned with how brains
“represent and recognize statistical invariances in the environment that guide
its actions, ultimately ensuring our survival in a world that is in a continuous
state of flux”[34]. Several approaches have been used to explore the information
content of neural responses. We will briefly review a few of these approaches and
clarify some common misconceptions about their use.
Multi-variate pattern analysis (MVPA) uses machine learning algorithms to
classify or predict experimental conditions or stimulus properties from multi-
variate patterns of activity [27]. This type of analysis performs an omnibus test
of whether a pattern of activity contains any information about a specific stim-
ulus property [11]. However, this method is problematic for the comparison of
computational models due to the geometric, spatial and representational ambi-
guity inherent to the approach [25].
3An alternative is to build encoding models wherein activity in each measure-
ment channel is modeled as a combination of features representing the stimuli.
When fitting an encoding model to data, the approach has also been called re-
verse correlation and situated in the context of system identification [36]. Because
this approach typically models each channel separately, it cannot capture infor-
mation in spatially distributed patterns of activity and suffers from a multiple
comparisons problem. However, An encoding model can sometimes be inverted
to get at multivariate information while still modeling channels independently
[26].
A complementary approach, representational similarity analysis (RSA), ab-
stracts away from measurement channels and instead works on activity dissimi-
larity matrices (DSMs) [18]. This allows for easy comparison across modalities,
species, and models while also including multivariate information. No model
fit to the data is needed. RSA is ideal for high-dimensional data because the
number of experimental conditions is usually less than the number of channels
[15, 17]. An extension of RSA, pattern-component modeling (PCM), operates
on the pattern components of the DSMs, further enabling comparisons between
different regions and individuals [7].
Diedrichsen & Kriegeskorte [6] present a common framework for understand-
ing encoding, representational-similarity and pattern-component analysis. They
note that these methods all calculate the statistical second moment of the ac-
tivity profile distribution, which contains all information about any differences
in mean and variance across experimental conditions (under the condition of
i.i.d. noise). Their definition of representation within this framework is that a
represented variable can be linearly decoded from a down-stream area. They
suggest that focusing on linear encoding as a starting point for evaluating any
representation model.
We agree that linear encoding is a good starting point but would like to clar-
ify the types of conclusions that can be drawn from these methods and propose
a different working definition of representation. From a representation learning
perspective, a representation defines the feature space in which some data live.
A series of representational transformations can be viewed as disentangling the
underlying factors of variation to make some specific information more easily
accessible. However, a representation is not defined by a single piece of informa-
tion but rather by the shape of the manifold on which the data lie within the
representational space [2]. Therefore, we propose the following qualification to
the types of conclusions that are drawn from encoding and RSA.
Proponents of encoding often make claims of the type “X stimulus property
is encoded in brain area Y” because they were able to predict responses in Y
from X representation of the stimulus (better than some other model Z). The
desired interpretation of this type of result is that the computational role of
region Y is to calculate or represent X. Even if model X captured 100% of the
variance in Y, this result is only a partial description of the information content
of the activity measured in Y. For example, mel-frequency cepstral coefficients
(MFCCs) are a commonly used acoustic feature for various machine hearing
4tasks. Linear classifiers can be trained on MFCCs to predict vowels [19], musical
instrument [12], and musical genre [33]. But MFCCs are not a representation of
vowels, instruments, or genre. From a computational perspective, the difference
between MFCCs and some representation of genre matters. Therefore, if MFCCs
were able to predict activity in some brain region, one cannot separate whether
the brain region is using a representation similar to MFCCs or if it is encoding
some other property that can be linearly decoded from MFCCs.
Similarly in RSA, authors sometimes make claims such as brain area X uses
a representation similar to that of model Y because their DSMs were highly
correlated. Such claims are imprecise because there are infinitely many stimulus
representations that will result in the same DSM. Any rotation or translation
of the data within the original feature space will lead to an identical DSM. Du-
tilleul et al. [8] have shown that if bivariate data are generated by a multivariate
Gaussian model and have a spherical variance-covariance structure, then the cor-
relation of the data will be quadratically related to the the correlation of their
DSMs. However, they performed simulations to show that this does not hold
for other types of models (mixtures of Gaussians, exponential, etc.) and demon-
strated with empirical results that DSMs may show significant correlation even
when the correlation of the data vectors is zero. Therefore, it is important to be
clear that RSA reveals the similarity of representational geometries—the relative
distinction between stimuli according to a particular distance metric—and says
very little about the form of the specific neural representation, which have been
abstracted away from in RSA.
We can distinguish between the information content of a representation and
its representational form. For example, the numerals 37 and XXXVII are equally
identifiable as the number 37, but the form of the representation is different.
Diedrichsen & Kriegeskorte [6] point out that “knowing the content and for-
mat of representations provides strong constraints for computational models of
brain information processing”[6]. Indeed, authors often motivate and interpret
encoding or RSA style analyses with questions about representational form. For
example, Turner [32] writes, “results using [an encoding] approach reveal that
specific features of experience often have widely distributed spatial representa-
tions in the brain”. These types of claims can be misleading because accurate
linear predictions do not reveal the form of neural representations. Several can-
didate stimulus representations may obtain identical encoding performance in
a given region. Conversely, a candidate stimulus representation may predict ac-
tivity equally well in large swaths of brain regions. Accurate linear predictions
reveal that a neural representation lives in some space of all possible linear trans-
formations of the model representation. This allows us to conclude that there is
some shared information between the model and the brain but does not allow
for conclusions about the form of neural representations.
MVPA, encoding and RSA make partial descriptions of the information con-
tent of neural representations. Therefore, these are complementary approaches,
as mentioned in [6]. Unambiguous description of the information content of a
neural representation would mean finding representations that can simultane-
5ously fully explain neural activity and be fully explained by the same neural
activity such that no variance in either domains is unaccounted for. We suggest
that new methods are necessary to describe the form of neural representations
and that DNNs may be especially amenable to new model evaluation techniques
that enable such description.
3 What can be learned from DNNs?
Recently, DNNs have been used as representational models in encoding and RSA
analyses of auditory [10] and visual [38, 1, 5, 14, 9] responses. The use of DNNs
as models of sensory processing allows for hypotheses to be embedded in the de-
sign of the network rather than in explicitly selected stimulus representations. In
this approach, typically each layer of a trained network is treated as a represen-
tational model and researchers look for correspondence between DNN layers and
brain regions [16]. Yamins & DiCarlo [37] point out that using DNNs as models
of sensory information processing is in line with Marr’s levels of understanding.
Unlike other unlearned representational models, goal-driven or task-optimized
models are functionally constrained to be able to perform some task. This ap-
proach seems to epitomize Love’s inside-out approach in that hypotheses about
neural representations are constrained both by computational theory (what the
system does) and implementation (how well does it align with neural measure-
ments?).
However, the usefulness of DNNs as models of neural information processing
has been questioned for several reasons, such as their biological implausibility
(which has been well addressed in [16, 22, 37]) and the fact that they are difficult
to interpret. Are linear models really preferable to DNNs because they are more
interpretable? Lipton [20] suggests that such claims about interpretability need
to be qualified because interpretability is not a monolithic concept, but rather it
can be divided into specific desirable attributes. They consider several properties
of interpretable models related to transparency (i.e. how does the model work?)
and post-hoc interpretations (i.e. what can the model tell me?). They conclude
that linear models are not strictly more interpretable than DNNs. For example,
“large linear models may be just as opaque as deep neural networks. However,
for post-hoc interpretability, deep neural networks exhibit a clear advantage,
learning rich representations that could be visualized, verbalized, or used for
clustering” [20].
Particularly in sensory neuroscience, researchers may ask “do DNNs learn
meaningful representations?” as a prerequisite for their usefulness. To some ex-
tent, this reflects the belief that in order for DNN to be useful, it should recover
what is already known about neural sensory information processing. Only then
might the DNN help to fill in the gaps of our knowledge. It also seems to re-
flect an expectation that DNNs learn features that can be understood, meaning
attributable to some property of the physical world or higher-level cognitive con-
cept. Kriegeskorte [16] points out that “a verbal functional interpretation of a
unit, e.g., as an eye or a face detector, may help our intuitive understanding and
6capture something important. However, such verbal interpretations may over-
state the degree of categoricality and localization, and understate the statistical
and distributed nature of these representations.” The brain’s capacity to map
from sensory input to high-level concepts will necessarily involve intermediate
representations that are not directly related to properties of the physical world
of objects of cognition. It is an advantage of DNNs that they also demonstrate
this complexity.
The “deep” aspect of deep neural networks also presents a challenge in that
each layer of a DNN can be viewed as a distinct representational model. Previous
work has mapped individual layers to different brain areas by comparing encod-
ing or RSA performance across layers and regions, but this still treats layers as
independent models. A good model will make accurate predictions across the en-
tire sensory processing pathway, not just at individual layers/regions, so ideally
entire networks would be evaluated rather than individual layers. The solution
to this challenge may also enable characterizations of representational form. Pe-
ters et al. [29] advocate for the “direct integration” of models and brain activity
by projecting them both into a common space, allowing for evaluations within
and across processing stages [28]. DNNs may be especially amenable to such an
approach because they can be designed to have correspondence with a particular
set of regions of interest. Additionally, graph theoretical methods have been de-
veloped allowing for definitions of brain graphs from functional, structural and
or diffusion weighted images [3]. Such brain graphs could be used as templates
for DNNs, providing a natural common space in which model and brain could
be compared directly. Such an approach could allow for the characterization of
representational form as well as content.
4 Conclusion
The goal of information-based neuroimage analysis is to describe human in-
telligence at the representation and algorithm level of understanding. These
methods can be seen as part of an inside-out approach wherein models are con-
strained by their performance (computational theory) and their correspondence
to brain activity (implementation). MVPA, encoding, and RSA yield comple-
mentary characterizations of the information content of neural representations.
However, these methods cannot easily characterize representational form. DNNs
are useful as models of sensory information processing because they can be de-
signed to demonstrate certain behaviours or structures of biological brains while
allowing unknown characteristics to be learned from data. This allows DNNs to
discover candidate representations in a data-driven manner that are constrained
by the behaviour of the network and their similarity (in form and content) to
measured neural representations. By constructing intelligent artificial networks
that demonstrate increasing biological realism and also modeling our neural
measurements as networks, we can begin to transfer knowledge about artificial
networks to knowledge about biological networks and vice versa.
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